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Contextualism and Anti-Contextualism 
in the Philosophy of Language*  
 
 
In the middle of this century so-called "ordinary-language philosophers" - most 
prominently Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Austin and Peter Strawson - put 
forward a new, "pragmatic" picture of language which stood in sharp contrast 
to the picture that had been dominant since the beginnings of analytic 
philosophy. Half a century later it is fair to say that the old picture which 
ordinary-language philosophers were opposing has been to a large extent 
restored to its position of dominance. To be sure, bits and pieces of the new 
picture had to be incorporated, and a number of pragmatic phenomena 
acknowledged and accounted for. But the old picture was not abandoned, as 
ordinary-language philosophers had urged; it was elaborated rather than 
eliminated. 
 In this paper I want to describe the central conflict between the two 
pictures ("contextualism" and "anti-contextualism", as I will call them), and the 
standard argument against contextualism. My conclusion will be that this 
argument, which is generally considered to have settled the issue, is in fact 
question-begging and should not have settled the issue.i 
 
* 
 
What is the debate exactly about? The basic question, I think, is whether we 
may legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content (the property of "saying" 
something, of expressing a thought or a proposition) to natural-language 
sentences, or whether it is only speech acts, utterances in context, that have 
content. Consider the type of formal language philosophers of the first half of 
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the century were concerned with. In these languages, sentences are given an 
interpretation that is fixed and does not depend on the context of use. Natural 
language sentences, by contrast, express a complete thought (say something 
definite) only with respect to a context of utterance - in many cases at least. The 
linguistic meaning which is assigned to them by virtue of the semantic rules of 
the language does not make them semantically complete, because this linguistic 
meaning involves variables that have to be contextually instantiated for the 
utterance to say something definite. This difference between natural language 
and a certain type of formal language is well-known, and no one has ever 
attempted to deny it. But there is disagreement as to the importance of the 
distinction. Contextualists hold that the difference between the two types of 
language is all-important; natural-language sentences, according to them, are 
essentially context-sensitive, and do not have determinate truth-conditions. 
Anti-contextualists, on the other hand, believe that the difference between the 
two types of language can be abstracted from through a legitimate idealisation. 
 The anti-contextualist idealisation is based on the following claim: 
 
(1) For every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive sentence in a 
given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be used to make the same 
statement in any context. 
 
To obtain an eternal sentence from a context-sensitive one, one has only to 
replace the indexical constituents of the latter by non-indexical constituents 
with the same semantic value. Owing to (1), the difference between natural 
languages and the formal languages in which the context of utterance plays no 
role turns out not to be essential. Using natural language, we could behave so 
as to abolish the difference - simply by choosing to utter only eternal sentences. 
The reason why we also (and mainly) use context-sensitive sentences is only 
that this enables us "to speak far more concisely than otherwise" (Katz, 1977: 
20). 
 Note that (1) is much weaker than another principle of effability, namely 
(2): 
 
(2) Every entertainable thought may be expressed by means of an eternal 
sentence the sense of which corresponds exactly to that thought. 
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Many philosophers have (rightly) argued against (2). For example, Sperber and 
Wilson write: 
 
It seems plausible that in our internal language we often fix time and space 
references not in terms of universal coordinates, but in terms of a private 
logbook and an ego-centred map; furthermore, most kinds of reference - to 
people and events for instance - can be fixed in terms of these private time 
and space coordinates. Thoughts which contain such private references 
could not be encoded in natural languages but could only be incompletely 
represented. (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 192). 
 
(1) is not subject to this criticism. (1) says only that every statement can be made 
using an eternal sentence, not that every thought can be literally expressed by 
an eternal sentence. Now, a statement may be of an object, in the sense that it 
may be about a certain object without involving a particular mode of 
presentation of that object. Such a de re statement corresponds to a class of 
thoughts, each involving a particular (and, perhaps, private) mode of 
presentation of the object referred to. The fact that, in the thought, there are 
private modes of presentation attached to the objects referred to implies that 
there are thoughts that cannot be totally and adequately represented by means 
of eternal sentences, but does not imply that there are statements that cannot be 
made by means of eternal sentences: statements are public objects at a more 
abstract level than thoughts, and as such do not contain private modes of 
presentation. 
 The contextualist denies (1), if only because he does not really believe 
that there are eternal sentences. Various arguments can be given in support of 
this denial. Let me mention some of these arguments: 
 
(a) It may be argued that there cannot be reference without a context - that not 
only indexical expressions ("I", "this") and incomplete definite descriptions 
("the table", "the president"), but also proper names and complete definite 
descriptions are referentially context-dependent. As for proper names, 
they may may be construed as a variety of indexicals (Cohen 1980). This 
view I personally find more attractive than the alternative, standard view. 
On the indexical view, the same proper name - say, "Aristotle" - may refer 
to different individuals in different contexts; on the standard view proper 
names are individuated (in part) by their bearers and cannot change their 
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reference while remaining the "same" proper name. The standard view 
entails that proper names are part of the language in a very strong sense: 
mastery of the language requires knowing, for every proper name, who or 
what the bearer of that name is. This seems to me much too strong. I agree 
that one does not know what is said by an utterance in which a proper 
name occurs unless one knows who or what the bearer of the name is, but 
this does not entail that mastery of the language (i.e., systematic 
knowledge of the meaning of sentence types) requires this piece of 
knowledge. Knowing who or what the bearer of a name is is like knowing 
who the speaker is: one may have to know this in order to know what is 
said by means of an utterance, yet this piece of knowledge is extra-
linguistic - contextual - rather than linguistic. What is linguistic is only the 
rule which says that "I" refers to the speaker, or that a proper name refers 
to its bearer.ii 
  As for complete definite descriptions, there are two lines of argument. 
One may attempt to show that, insofar as they involve spatio-temporal 
coordinates, they necessarily involve indexicals or proper names (to fix the 
origin of the spatio-temporal coordinates); or one may attempt to show 
that the reference of a definite description always depends on the "domain 
of discourse" (Recanati 1987) or "mental space" (Fauconnier 1985) with 
respect to which it is intended to be evaluated. Think of the following case: 
John wrongly believes that Bush is the President of the USA. Knowing that 
Bush is in the next room, I say: "If he goes in the next room, John will be 
surprised to meet the President of the USA". Here the description "The 
President of the USA" refers to Bush rather than to the actual President 
(Clinton) because it is intended to be interpreted with respect to a world, 
namely John's belief-world, in which Bush is the President of the USA. (A 
simpler but more controversial example has John himself 
straightforwardly and sincerely saying "The President of the USA is in the 
next room" and thereby referring to Bush.) On this account, even the 
reference of a complete definite description (like "The President of the USA 
in 1993") is context-dependent, since (i) it depends on the domain of 
discourse with respect to which the description is to be interpreted, and (ii) 
the domain of discourse itself is context-dependent. 
 
(b) It may be argued that predication, in many cases, requires a context, 
because of what has been called the open texture of most empirical 
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concepts (Waismann 1953). On this view, the meaning of a great number of 
predicative expressions is not a "definition" that determines their 
conditions of application. The latter may change from context to context, as 
they are under-determined at the linguistic level. The expressions in 
question are typically used in talking about "ordinary" situations, and with 
respect to these situations they have certain conditions of application; but 
if one considers extraordinary situations it is not clear in advance what 
exactly the conditions of application of the expression will be with respect 
to them (Austin 1971: 67-9; see also the works by Travis and Searle listed in 
the bibliography). This will depend on what is considered relevant in the 
context of utterance. 
 
One may accept these arguments, and still hold that there are eternal sentences. 
After all, a sentence such as "Some triangles are equilateral" involves neither 
reference to particular objects nor empirical properties. What arguments (a) and 
(b) seem to imply is only that there are some important types of statement that 
cannot be made by means of eternal sentences. However, it is possible to go 
further and claim that even a sentence such as "Some triangles are equilateral" 
is not an eternal sentence, for at least three reasons: 
 
(c)  It may be argued that quantification always requires a context. When I say 
"Everybody went to Paris", there is an implicit reference to a domain of 
quantification (everybody in a certain group, everybody in the universe, 
and so on). This domain must be contextually specified, even if it is the 
"universal" domain, as in "Some triangles are equilateral". After all, this 
sentence might be used, quite literally, to say that some triangles in a 
relevant set (e.g. some of the triangles on the blackboard) are equilateral: 
the universal interpretation is only one contextual interpretation among 
many others.iii To be sure, the domain may also be explicitly described in 
the sentence, but when it is so described the description itself may refer to 
different domains of quantification depending on the "domain of 
discourse" with respect to which it is intended to be interpreted (see 
above). It follows that no quantificational sentence is eternal. 
 
(d)  Even though "equilateral" is a one-criterion word that has a clear 
definition, still it makes different contributions to the truth-conditions of 
the utterance where it occurs depending on the "standards of precision" 
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that are considered relevant in the context of utterance (Lewis 1979). 
Remember Austin's famous example: "France is hexagonal". This sentence 
will sometimes be considered as true and sometimes as false, depending 
on the context of utterance ("Good enough for a top-ranking general, 
Austin says, but not for a geographer") iv . It follows that the truth-
conditions of the utterance depend on the context. The same thing holds in 
the case of "Some triangles are equilateral". The same triangles - for 
examples those on the blackboard - will be considered "equilateral" or not 
equilateral depending on the standards of precisions that are contextually 
relevant. It follows that even the conditions of application of "equilateral" 
are contextually variable. 
 
(e)  Tense is known to be indexical. An eternal sentence must therefore be 
tenseless. But are there tenseless sentences? Anti-contextualist 
philosophers claim that there is a "tenseless present", as in "Snow is white" 
or "Some triangles are equilateral". Does this mean that the "present tense" 
is semantically ambiguous between a temporal and a nontemporal 
(tenseless) reading? To claim that the present is semantically ambiguous 
would violate the methodological principle Grice called "Modified 
Occam's Razor": Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Other 
theories, which do not posit a semantic ambiguity, are preferable, but they 
entail that a sentence in the (so-called) "tenseless present" is not an eternal 
sentence: the tenseless present interpretation, according to these theories, 
is highly context-dependent. Again, it follows that "Some triangles are 
equilateral" is not an eternal sentence. 
 
I am fully aware that these arguments are controversial; in every case, I take it, 
a reply is available to the anti-contextualist. Moreover, not all arguments in the 
list are equally important as far as the contextualism/anti-contextualism debate 
is concerned. What the contextualist must ultimately show is that there could 
not be eternal sentences, and this conclusion is served - if at all - only by a 
subset of the above arguments (the arguments pertaining to domains of 
discourse, open texture, and standards of precision). Be that as it may I will not 
go into the details of the controversy here,  for I merely wanted to stress that 
there is room for a controversy. Why, then, is the debate considered as more or 
less settled? In the fifties contextualism was taken for granted; nowadays it it 
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considered as refuted. Why? What happened that made anti-contextualism look 
more attractive than contextualism? 
 What actually happened is that Paul Grice launched a counter-attack on 
contextualism, a counter-attack which was very successful. But the victory 
thereby gained over contextualism was undeserved. As I will now try to show, 
the argument Grice used in his counter-attack was either fallacious or did not 
constitute a refutation of contextualism. 
 
* 
 
From the anti-contextualist point of view, the "normal" case is the case in which 
a sentence expresses a proposition independent of the context of utterance. The 
cases in which it is not so (indexical sentences) are reducible to the normal case 
via principle (1): to use an indexical sentence is to rely on contextual features 
instead of using one of the eternal sentences the language provides for saying 
the same thing. Indexical sentences are used as convenient abbreviations for 
longer, eternal sentences. This habit of using abbreviated sentences containing 
indexical elements does not seriously affect the picture of language that 
emerges from an exclusive study of (putative) eternal sentences. On this 
picture, sentences express propositions by virtue of their linguistic meaning 
alone. If follows that: 
 
(Parallelism Principle)  
If a (syntactically complete) sentence can be used in different contexts to say 
different things (to express different propositions), then the explanation for 
this contextual variation of content is that the sentence has different 
linguistic meanings - is semantically ambiguous. 
 
To be sure, another explanation for a contextual variation of content is possible 
(and actually preferable) when the sentence contains an indexical expression, 
for indexical sentences express different propositions in different contexts 
without being semantically ambiguous. But indexicality is taken to be a well 
circumscribed phenomenon; on the anti-contextualist view, indexicality is the 
characteristic property of a finite class of expressions, the members of which are 
well-known: personal pronouns, demonstratives, tenses, some adverbs 
indicating location in space and time, some predicates such as "come", etc. If a 
sentence which expresses different propositions in different contexts does not 
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contain one of these recognizable expressions, or if it contains one but the 
contextual variation in propositional content seems unrelated to the fact that it 
contains it, then we may safely use the Parallelism Principle to conclude that 
the sentence is semantically ambiguous. 
 The Parallelism Principle is an essential premiss in the Gricean argument 
against contextualism. A second essential premiss is what Grice called 
Modified Occam's Razor, which I have used earlier in this paper: 
 
(Modified Occam's Razor) 
Senses (linguistic meanings) are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. 
 
By virtue of Modified Occam's Razor, the analyst which observes that a 
sentence has two different interpretations when uttered in different contexts 
must refrain from considering that this intuitive difference in interpretation 
reflects a difference in linguistic meaning, i.e. a semantic ambiguity. She must, 
if possible, ascribe this difference to a property of the context of utterance rather 
than to an ambiguity in the sentence itself. 
 Together, Modified Occam's Razor and the Parallelism Principle entail 
that the analyst must not only refrain from considering that a contextual 
difference in interpretation reflects a difference in linguistic meaning, but also 
refrain from considering that it reflects a difference in propositional content, in 
"what is said" by the sentence when it is uttered in this or that context. For 
suppose we take the difference in interpretation to be a difference in 
propositional content. Then, by virtue of the Parallelism Principle, this 
difference in content is to be explained in terms of a difference in linguistic 
meaning (semantic ambiguity); but positing a semantic ambiguity is precisely 
what Modified Occam's Razor says the analyst should refrain from doing. It 
follows that the analyst must, if possible, explain the contextual difference in 
interpretation by a property of the context of utterance, while maintaining that 
the sentence itself is not ambiguous and that "what is strictly and literally said" 
(the propositional content) does not change from one context to the other. 
 A general solution along these lines has been sketched by Grice. It is 
based on the notion of conversational implicature. A conversational implicature 
is something which is communicated by an utterance and therefore belongs to 
its overall interpretation, but which belongs neither to the linguistic meaning of 
the sentence uttered nor to what is said by the utterance of this sentence; it is an 
aspect of interpretation that is external to what is said. (Indeed, working out the 
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implicatures of an utterance presupposes identifying what this utterance 
"says".) Modified Occam's Razor and the Parallelism Principle lead one to 
favour an analysis that accounts for a contextual difference in interpretation in 
terms of conversational implicature, over an account in terms of a variation in 
propositional content. This is, basically, the Gricean argument against 
contextualism. 
 Contextualism holds that what is said depends on the context of 
utterance. The evidence in favor of contextualism is provided by indefinitely 
many examples in which the same sentence, which does not seem to be 
ambiguous, is used in different contexts to say different things. With respect to 
these examples, the Gricean argues that: 
 
(i) It is not necessary to consider that, in these examples, the sentence actually 
says different things in different contexts; it is also possible to account for the 
facts - namely, the intuitive difference between the interpretation of the 
utterance in one context and its interpretation in another context - in terms of 
conversational implicature, while maintaining that one and the same thing is 
said by the utterance whatever the context. 
(ii) Given Modified Occam's Razor and the Parallelism Principle, the account in 
terms of conversational implicature is actually preferable to an account in 
terms of a contextual variation of propositional content. 
 
This argument is fallacious, because it begs the question. It involves a premiss, 
namely the Parallelism Principle, which a contextualist cannot accept. 
Certainly, for a contextualist, it is not true, even in general, that a variation of 
propositional content has to be accounted for in terms of a variation in 
linguistic meaning. The contextualist holds that the propositional content of an 
utterance depends on the context and not just on the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence. It follows that a contextual variation in the propositional content of 
the utterance does not entail a corresponding variation in the linguistic 
meaning of the sentence. The Parallelism Principle has therefore to be dropped, 
but if it is dropped, then Modified Occam's Razor can no longer be used to 
show that an account in terms of implicature is preferable to an account in 
terms of a contextual variation in propositional content. Modified Occam's 
Razor shows that an account in terms of implicature is preferable to an account 
in terms of semantic ambiguity, but an account in terms of contextually variable 
propositional content can no longer be reduced to an account in terms of 
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semantic ambiguity, once the Parallelism Principle is dropped. I conclude that 
the Gricean argument succeeds only by begging the question against 
contextualism. 
 In actual practice, the Parallelism Principle is not explicitly stated as a 
premiss of the Gricean argument. However, Modified Occam's Razor (or an 
equivalent principle of economy) is used to support the conclusion that an 
account in terms of implicature is preferable to an account in terms of content, 
and I believe that Modified Occam's Razor can be used to that effect only if one 
accepts the Parallelism Principle. So the latter is actually presupposed by the 
Gricean argument. 
 Let me give examples of actual uses of the Gricean argument. The first 
example is its use by Grice himself, against Strawson and ordinary-language 
philosophers. The second example is a now classical use of the Gricean 
argument against Donnellan's view of the referential/attributive distinction. 
 In Introduction to Logical Theory, Strawson claims that there is a 
difference between the logical formula 'P • Q' and the natural-language 
sentence 'P and Q': while the former is logically equivalent to 'Q • P', the 
statement made by "They had a child and got married" is not the same as the 
statement made by "They got married and had a child"; in the latter case, 
Strawson points out, the order of the clauses "may be relevant... to the truth-
conditions", while the truth-conditions of 'P • Q' are given by the truth-table for 
"•" and are therefore independent of the order of the clauses (Strawson 1952: 
80-81). Whether the order of the clauses is actually relevant to the truth-
conditions of a given utterance of 'P and Q' depends on the context. In 
Strawson's terminology, there are various "uses" of "and" in natural language, 
corresponding to different truth-conditions for 'P and Q'. Sometimes a sentence 
'P and Q' is used to say that P and then Q, and sometimes it is used to say 
something different (e.g. the same thing as 'P • Q'). There is no "rule" fixing the 
truth-conditions of 'P and Q' independent of the context, contrary to what 
happens in the case of 'P • Q'. 
 This is what Strawson says. Now it is commonly believed that Grice 
refuted Strawson, by means of the following argument: 
 
(i) Instead of saying that there is a difference between 'P • Q' and 'P and Q', we 
may consider that there is no such difference and that the truth-conditions of 
'P and Q' are actually the same as those of 'P • Q'. For example, we may 
consider the temporal implication in "They got married and had a child" as a 
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conversational implicature, external to what is said, rather than considering 
it as part of the truth-conditions of the utterance in a certain type of context. 
In this way, we are able to maintain that the truth-conditions of 'P and Q' are 
determined by the truth-table for "•", independent of the context of 
utterance. 
(ii) By virtue of Modified Occam's Razor, the account in terms of conversational 
implicature is preferable to the account in terms of a semantic difference 
between 'P • Q' and 'P and Q'. 
 
This argument does not work. I accept the first premiss, but I reject the second 
one. By virtue of Modified Occam's Razor, an account in terms of implicature is 
preferable to an account in terms of semantic ambiguity (i.e. to an account that 
"multiplies senses beyond necessity"). But Strawson's claim may be construed 
as an account in terms of context-sensitivity rather than ambiguity. The 
difference between 'P • Q' and 'P and Q', according to Strawson, is that the 
truth-conditions of the former are determined by the truth-table for "•" and do 
not vary contextually, while the truth-conditions of the latter depend on a 
number of factors and may vary with the context of utterance. Strawson's claim 
per se does not entail that "and" is semantically ambiguous: this implication 
holds only if we accept the Parallelism Principle, according to which every 
contextual difference in propositional content corresponds to a semantic 
difference in linguistic meaning. But to accept the Parallelism Principle is to beg 
the question against contextualism. 
 If premiss (ii) is rejected, as it should be, we are left with an argument 
(consisting of (i) only) which no longer provides a refutation of Strawson's 
contextualist position. What it provides is merely an alternative to that position. 
In other words, Grice's argument only shows that examples such as "They got 
married and had a child" can be handled within an anti-contextualist 
framework, thanks to the notion of implicature. But it does not show that these 
examples must be so handled. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, 
Strawson has not been refuted by the Gricean argument. What has been shown 
is that a contextualist account of examples such as 'P and Q' is not mandatory, 
but such an account is still possible.v 
 Another, more recent example is provided by contemporary discussions 
of Donnellan's distinction. Many philosophers argue as follows: 
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(i) The difference between the referential and the attributive reading of a 
definite description may be considered not as a difference in the content of 
what is said by means of a sentence with this description occurs, but as a 
difference in what is pragmatically "conveyed" by the utterance. Thus, we 
may consider that the same proposition is expressed on the attributive and 
the referential readings, and account for the difference by saying that, in the 
referential reading, a conversational implicature combines with what is 
strictly and literally said, while there is no such implicature in the attributive 
reading. 
(ii) Given Modified Occam's Razor, this pragmatic account of Donnellan's 
distinction is to be preferred to Donnellan's own account in terms of a 
systematic difference of propositional content (of truth-conditions). 
 
Again, premiss (ii) must be rejected. Modified Occam's Razor provides no 
reason to reject an account such as Donnellan's, according to which the 
difference between the referential and the attributive reading of a description is 
a difference in truth-conditions, in propositional content (Donnellan 1966); it 
only provides a reason to reject an account in terms of semantic ambiguity. To 
be sure, accounts in terms of contextually variable truth-conditions are 
generally equated with accounts in terms of semantic ambiguity, in accordance 
with the Parallelism Principle. But Donnellan cannot accept the Parallelism 
Principle: he holds that the difference between the two readings is a difference 
in truth-conditional content, but he also says that the referential/attributive 
distinction is not a semantic ambiguity. Clearly, this implies rejecting the 
Parallelism Principle. But once the Parallelism Principle is rejected, Modified 
Occam's Razor can no longer be used against Donnellan's position.vi 
 
* 
 
Let me conclude. There are, in principle, three ways of handling examples in 
which the utterance of the same sentence has different interpretations 
depending on the context. One may (A) consider the sentence as semantically 
ambiguous, or (B) consider that the propositional content (the truth-conditions) 
of the utterance depends on the context, or (C) account for the difference in 
interpretation by positing a conversational implicature that combines with 
what is said in some contexts but not others. Modified Occam's Razor provides 
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a reason for avoiding (A) if possible. But how are we to choose between (B) and 
(C)? 
 Modified Occam's Razor does not provide an argument against (B), 
contrary to what is generally assumed. So we really have two possibilities. How 
to choose between them in a particular case is an open question, a question that 
has be answered for the debate between contextualism and anti-contextualism 
to be settled in a non-question-begging way. Remember the contextualist 
arguments I mentioned earlier in this paper: they all rely on a certain way of 
analysing the examples, in conformity to (B), but this may not be the right way 
of analyzing them. For example, it is an open question whether the sentence 
"Some triangles are equilateral" can be used literally to say that some triangles 
on the blackboard are equilateral, or whether "France is hexagonal" can be used 
literally to say that France is roughly hexagonal. (According to some accounts, 
the sentences in question can be used to make the statements in question only if 
they are used non-literally: see e.g. Bach 1987 and Sperber & Wilson 1986.) 
These specific questions, or the general question of the criteria that are to be 
used in a particular case to make a decision in favor of solution (B) or solution 
(C), I take to be empirical questions.vii 
 The problem with the anti-contextualist framework is that, in this 
framework, these questions are not really considered as open questions. In 
practice, the anti-contextualist presupposes the Parallelism Principle and 
describes the case as if solution (B) was not a genuine possibility; he recognizes 
the possibility of solution (B) only when the sentence is a standard indexical 
sentence. This strategy prevents one from seriously dealing with the questions I 
have just raised. I conclude that, whether or not one believes that there could be 
eternal sentences, one should at least adhere to a weak form of contextualism, 
which might be called "Methodological Contextualism". Methodological 
Contextualism says that there is, in principle, a difference between the linguistic 
meaning of the sentence and what is said by an utterance of the sentence, and a 
correlative difference between the linguistic meaning of an expression - 
whatever it is - and the contribution the expression makes to the proposition 
expressed by the sentence where it occurs. It is only if we assume this weak 
form of contextualism that we can hope to be some day in a position to settle 
the contextualism/anti-contextualism debate. 
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i Ironically, the argument in question was first put forward by Paul Grice, who 
himself belonged to the group of ordinary-language philosophers and made a 
very significant contribution to pragmatics. Grice thought, wrongly I believe, 
that his important distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's 
meaning constituted an objection to the contextualism professed by his fellow 
ordinary-language philosophers. More on this below. 
ii For a detailed defence of the indexical view of proper names, see Recanati 
1993, chapters 8-9. 
iii Of course this claim is highly controversial. Many will say that the universal 
interpretation is the only one that is "literal". See below. 
iv Austin 1975:143. 
v For a contextualist account of "and", see Carston 1988. 
vi A full defence of Donnellan's position is offered in Recanati 1993, chapter 15. 
vii These questions are addressed in Recanati 1989, 1993. 
